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INTRODUCTION

Everyone noticed it. He killed over one hundred people, but not
once did he show any sign of remorse. More than anything else perhaps, observers of Timothy McVeigh noticed that he never broke
t
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down, never cried, never said "I'm sorry." In a word, he was remorseless. Yet remorse was what everyone had hoped to see, including the
jurors.'
. But what role does remorse really play in capital sentencing? We
divide this basic question in two. First, what makes jurors come to
believe a defendant is remorseful? Second, does a belief in the defendant's remorse affect the jury's final judgment of life or death? Here
we present a systematic, empirical analysis that tries to answer these
questions. The data on which we rely come from interviews with over
150 jurors who served on capital cases in South Carolina.
What makes jurors think a defendant is remorseful? Among
other things, we find that the more jurors think that the crime is coldblooded, calculated, and depraved and that the defendant is dangerous, the less likely they are to think the defendant is remorseful. Conversely, the less they think the defendant is responsible for the crime,
the more likely they are to believe he is remorseful. The defendant's
demeanor during trial also influences jurors' beliefs about remorse.
As for the background and the attitudes of the jurors themselves,
we find that jurors with strong views in favor of the death penalty are
less likely to think the defendant is remorseful. We also find that
while racial factors generally do not influence jurors' beliefs about the
defendant's remorse, white women are least likely to believe the defendant is remorseful. However, because most of the defendants in
our sample were men, it is difficult to tell whether this result means
that white women tend not to believe in the remorse of male defendants or that they tend not to believe in the remorse of any defendant.
Does a defendant's remorse or lack of remorse affect the sentence he receives? The general answer is yes. The more precise answer is sometimes. Remorse benefits some defendants, but not others.
In multivariate models of sentencing outcomes that account for the
perceived "viciousness" of the crime, we find that jurors' belief in the
defendant's remorse noticeably improves the predictive value of the
models-provided jurors do not think the crime is extremely vicious.
When jurors do think the crime is extremely vicious, their belief in the
defendant's remorse appears to have little influence on the sentence
he receives.
I See, e.g., Tom Kenworthy & William Booth, Bomb Jurors Profoundly Affected, WASH.
PosT, June 15, 1997, at Al (reporting one juror as saying he was "'very bothered that
[McVeigh] was so stone-faced'"); see also Adam Nossiter, City That Embraced Victims Reacts
with Grim Approva N.Y. TIMEs,June 14, 1997, at 9 (reporting grandmother of two victims as
saying "'I sat in the courtroom and saw Tim McVeigh, and prayed for some kind of remorse?'"); Louis Roman & Tom Kenworthy, What Moved Him? Mystery Unsolved, Aiuz. REP.,
June 14, 1997, at Al (noting McVeigh's lack of remorse). But cf. Kenworthy & Booth,
supra, at Al (reporting that another juror said, "'We wanted to see some remorse, but it
was not important?'").
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Part I describes the data we use in the study. Part II describes
South Carolina law as it bears on the role of remorse in capital sentencing. Using bivariate analysis, Part III addresses our first question:
What makes jurors think a defendant is or is not remorseful? Part IV
explores the same question, only using multivariate analysis. Finally,
Part V uses both bivariate and multivariate analysis to address our second question: Does remorse matter to the sentencing outcome?
I
THE CAPrIAL JuRY PROJECT IN SouTH CAROLINA

We gathered the data analyzed here as part of the Capital Jury
Project ("Project"), a multistate research effort funded by the National Science Foundation. Until now, researchers trying to draw inferences about how jurors determine capital-case sentences have
tended "to rely on surveys of the general population, on anecdotal
2
data from individual cases, and on material in the written record."
Researchers have not systematically gathered data from jurors who
served on capital cases. The Project fills this void, providing a rich
source of information about capital sentencing jurors' beliefs and decision-making processes.
Our analysis rests on data gathered from the Project's efforts in
South Carolina. We randomly sampled jurors from forty-one South
Carolina murder cases, with a goal of interviewing four jurors per
case. The sample includes twenty-two cases resulting in death
sentences and nineteen cases resulting in life sentences. The cases in
the study represent all South Carolina capital cases brought by the
State between the enactment of the South Carolina Omnibus Criminal Justice Improvements Act of 1986 and the summer of 1993.3 The
1986 law fundamentally changed the parole standards in capital cases
and provided a natural stopping point as we worked our way backwards from the most current cases then available. Trained interviewers completed a total of 153 live interviews. Moreover, although our
data are limited to South Carolina jurors, the published research us-

2 Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion:JurorInstructionsin Capital'
Cases, 79 CoRNruL L. REv. 1, 2 (1993) (citations omitted).
3 See South Carolina Omnibus Criminal justice Improvements Act of 1986 § 27, 1986
S.C. Acts 2955, 2983 (changing parole eligibility standards). An earlier article using these
data incorrectly states that the sample includes 43 cases. SeeTheodore Eisenberg et al.,Jury
Responsibility in Capital Sentencing- An Empirical Study, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 339, 350 (1996).
However, because that article addressed juror-level issues, and the number of interviews
was correct, see id., the misstatement of the number of cases has no effect on the results
there presented.
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ing nationwide data gives no reason to date to think South Carolina
4
jurors behave atypically.
The fifty-one page interview instrument, which the Project
designed and tested, covered all phases of both the guilt and the sentencing trials.5 The data derived from the interviews include variables
about the facts of the crime; about the racial, economic, and other
characteristics of the defendant, of the victim, and of the victim's family; about the process of juror deliberation; and about the defense
counsel's, the prosecutor's, and the judge's handling of the case. The
data also include variables about jurors' demographic characteristics
and about their views on the death penalty.
Despite its benefits, this interview methodology limits the conclusions we can draw. For example,jurors may not be adept at evaluating
what factors influence their own thinking, 6 or they may give answers
they think the interviewer wants to hear. 7 Moreover, jurors' memories
may have deteriorated between the time of their service and the time
of their interview.8 Finally, the interviewers spoke with jurors after
they served, not before. Consequently, due to possible hindsight bias,
we cannot tell for certain whether the jurors' post-trial responses represent what they believed at the time of trial or instead represent ex
post rationalizations.9 For example, jurors who voted for death may
have felt compelled to "recall" that the defendant was remorseless
when asked about it after the fact.
4 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 3, at 354 (finding that the "pattern of responses
[from South Carolina jurors regarding perceptions of their sentencing responsibilities) is
largely the same as that reported in . . . Project data from several states"); Stephen P.
Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in CapitalCases: What DoJurors Think?, 98 CoLuM. L. Rxv.

1538, 1575-76 (1998) (comparing reactions ofjurors from South Carolina to various aggravating and mitigating factors with reactions of jurors from several states and finding no
statistically significant differences). CompareEisenberg & Wells, supra note 2, at 6-7 (using
South Carolina data to examine howjurors' impressions of the defendant's dangerousness
influence their decision making), with William J. Bowers, The CapitalJury Project: Rationale,
Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1090-93 (1995) (using nationwide

data to examine how jurors' impressions of the defendant's dangerousness influence their
decision making).
5 SeeJustice Research Center, Northeastern University, Juror Interview Instrument:
National Study of Juror Decision Making in Capital Cases (unpublished document, on file
with authors) [hereinafter Juror Interview Instrument].
6 See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, How JuriesDecide Death: The Contributionsof the CapitalJury

Project, 70 IND. LJ. 1233, 1235 (1995) ("Researchers have discovered that individuals are
not particularly good at assessing the impact of factors that affect their thinking.").
7 See, e.g., id. at 1236 ( "[Jurors] will experience pressures to present themselves in a
socially desirable way to the interviewer.").
8 See, e.g., id. at 1235-36 (noting that "Ij]urors' memories will deteriorate and change

over time").
9 See, e.g., id. at 1236. For a helpful discussion of hindsight bias, see generally
Jonathan D. Casper et al., JurorDecisionMaking Attitudes, and the HindsightBias, 13 LAw &
HuM. BEHAV. 291 (1989) (assessing the impact of hindsight bias on juror decision making
in civil suits against police officers).
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II
WHAT DOES THE LAW SAY ABOUT REMORSE?

South Carolina's capital-sentencing scheme is like that of many
states. The capital trial is bifurcated into a guilt phase and a penalty
phase. 10 If the jury finds the presence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, the defendant becomes "death eligible."" Having made that finding, the jury can sentence the defendant to death
or to life imprisonment.' 2 Finally, South Carolina law, like the law of
most other states, provides the jury with a list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to guide its sentencing decision.' 8
Aggravating circumstances include murder committed during the
commission of certain serious crimes such as kidnapping and rape,

murder of a police officer, and murder by a defendant with a previous
murder conviction.' 4 Statutory mitigating circumstances include lack
of a prior conviction for a violent crime, impaired mental capacity,
10 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
11 See id. ("[Ijf a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the defendant must be
sentenced to either death or life imprisonment.").
12

See id.

13
14

See id. § 16-3-20(C).

See id. The full text of the statute outlines the following circumstances that South
Carolina law denominates as "aggravating":
(1) The murder was committed while in the commission of [specified)
crimes or acts....
(2) The murder was committed by a person with a prior conviction for
murder.
(3) The offender by his act of murder knowingly created a great risk of
death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or
device which normally would be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person.
(4) The offender committed the murder for himself or another for the
purpose of receiving money or a thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, solicitor, former solicitor, or other officer of the court during or because of the exercise
of his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The murder of a federal, state, or local law enforcement officer, peace
officer or former peace officer, corrections employee or former corrections
employee, or fireman or former fireman during or because of the performance of his official duties.
(8) The murder of a family member of an official listed in subitems (5)
and (7) above with the intent to impede or retaliate against the official.
"Family member" means a spouse, parent, brother, sister, child, or person
to whom the official stands in the place of a parent or a person living in the
official's household and related to him by blood or marriage.
(9) Two or more persons were murdered by the defendant by one act or
pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct.
(10) The murder of a child eleven years of age or under.
(11) The murder of a witness or potential witness committed at any time
during the criminal process for the purpose of impeding or deterring prosecution of any crime.

1604

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1599

duress, and provocation. 15 In addition to these statutory circumstances, the jury is free to consider nonstatutory factors, both aggravating and mitigating. 16 Thejury's decision to sentence the defendant to
death must be unanimous. 17 If the jury cannot reach unanimity, the
statute requires the court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment.' 8
How does remorse fit within this scheme? On the mitigation side
of the sentencing equation, the answer is pretty clear. Although
South Carolina law does not list remorse as a mitigating circumstance,
a capital defendant nonetheless enjoys a constitutional right to proffer
in mitigation "any aspect of [his] character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense."'19 Along with most, if not all, otherju15 See id. The full text of the statute outlines the following circumstances that South
Carolina law denominates "mitigating":
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conviction
involving the use of violence against another person.
(2) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance.
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented
to the act.
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor.
(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired.
(7) The age or mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(8) The defendant was provoked by the victim into committing the
murder.
(9) The defendant was below the age of eighteen at the time of the crime.
(10) The defendant had mental retardation at the time of the crime.
'Mental retardation" means significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the developmental period.
Id.
16
See id. (stating that the jury may consider "mitigating circumstances othenvise authorized or allowed by law").
17
See id. ("The jury shall not recommend the death penalty if the vote for such penalty is not unanimous.... .").
18 See id. (stating that if the jury cannot agree to recommend death, the judge "shall

sentence the defendant to life imprisonment").
19 E.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); accord McKoy v.
North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 44043 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374-75
(1988); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987).
Although the Supreme Court never expressly has held that remorse is mitigating, it
has noted the mitigating role of remorse in dicta. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,
356-57 (1993) (noting in the statement of facts that the defense emphasized defendant's
remorse); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("As any trial attorney will attest, serious prejudice could result if medication
inhibits the defendant's capacity ...to demonstrate remorse or compassion."); Clemons v.
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 771-72 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting that the defendant "argued that his remorse for the crime constituted a
mitigating factor" and arguing that appellate judges are ill-suited to evaluate a defendant's
remorse on appeal); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (noting in the
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risdictions, 20 South Carolina accordingly appears to treat remorse as a
21
mitigating factor in capital-sentencing proceedings.
Remorse may be mitigating in two different ways. 22 First, its mitigating effect may be freestanding. On this account, remorse is the
proper moral response to one's wrongdoing, and wrongdoers who experience remorse possess a quality of character thatjurors rightly con-

statement of facts that defense counsel "argued that [defendant's] remorse and acceptance
of responsibility justified sparing him from the death penalty"); McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 188 (1971) (noting in the statement of facts that defendant "related
his ...remorse").
20
See, e.g., McGahee v. State, 632 So. 2d 976, 981 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (noting that
"trial court found the existence of four mitigating circumstances," including "that the [defendant] has expressed some remorse for his actions"); State v. Brewer, 826 P.2d 783, 804
(Ariz. 1992) ("Remorse may be a mitigating factor if found to exist."); Clark v. State, 672
A.2d 1004, 1009 (Del. 1996) (noting that defendants "remorse" was a "mitigating factor[ ]"); Parker v. State, 643 So. 2d 1032, 1035 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam) ("Jurors also may
consider remorse or repentance."); Jackson v. State, 684 So. 2d 1213, 1238 (Miss. 1996)
(en banc) (holding that "'catch-all'" instruction on mitigation was sufficient to encompass
evidence of "extreme remorse"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1703 (1997); State v. Moore, 553
N.W.2d 120, 142 (Neb. 1996) (noting that "expressions of remorse for the killings" were
relevant mitigating evidence), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1448 (1997); Echavarria v. State, 839
P.2d 589, 596 (Nev. 1992) (per curiam) (noting that common-law right of allocution entities the defendant to "stand before the sentencing authority and present an unswom statement in mitigation of sentence, including statements of remorse" (internal quotations
omitted)); State v. Loftin, 680 A.2d 677, 709 (NJ. 1996) ("During allocution, a defendant
is permitted to make a brief statement in order to allow the jury to ascertain that he or she
is an individual capable of feeling and expressing remorse ..

" (internal quotations omit-

ted)); State v.Jones, 451 S.E.2d 826, 847 (N.C. 1994) ("[T] estimony that the defendant was
sorry for what he had done showed his remorse ... [and was] relevant mitigating evidence."); State v. Rojas, 592 N.E.2d 1376, 1387 (Ohio 1992) ("[Defendant's] remorse and
assistance to the police are mitigating factors."); Malone v. State, 876 P.2d 707, 719 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1994) (noting that "mitigating evidence showed... [that the defendant] exhibited remorse for his actions"); Commonwealth v. Holland, 543 A.2d 1068, 1077 (Pa.
1988) ("[T]he demeanor of a defendant, including his apparent remorse, is a proper factor to be considered by ajury in the sentencing phase of a capital case."); ExparteJacobs,
843 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (noting that evidence of remorse was relevant
but did not require special instruction); State v. Pirtle, 904 P.2d 245, 274 (Wash. 1995) (en
banc) (noting that "remorse for the crime" is relevant mitigating evidence).
Cf. State v. Koon, 328 S.E.2d 625, 627 (S.C. 1984) (treating remorse as mitigating
21
circumstance in context of statutory proportionality review), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991).
See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy, in REPtNTAcE: A
22
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 143, 148-49, 157 (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carney eds., 1997)
(explaining that remorse mitigates both in a deterrence framework by showing that the
defendant is "less likely to commit crimes again" and in a retribution framework by showing that the defendant "has a better character"). The cases interpreting § 3E1.1 (a) of the
federal sentencing guidelines, which provides for a sentencing reduction if an offender
"clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense," U.S. SETNCING
COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3EL. (a) (1994), also reflect these two theories. See
Michael M. O'Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and "Acceptanceof Responsibility: The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the FederalSentencing Guidelines,91 Nw. U. L. REv.
1507, 1523-42 (1997) (discussing the two theories).
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sider in mitigation. 23 Alternatively, remorse's mitigating effect may be
derivative. On this account, remorse is mitigating because it serves as
evidence that the defendant, having made his first step on the way to
rehabilitation, is less likely to be dangerous in the future.2 4 Whatever
the normative grounds for remorse's mitigating effect, defense lawyers
generally agree that remorse plays an important role in the jury's de25
termination of their client's fate.
What about lack of remorse? In some states, the applicable statutory scheme limits aggravating evidence to that which falls within the
scope of the statute's enumerated aggravating circumstances.2 6 Consequently, if lack of remorse is not included on the list of aggravating
factors, the jury cannot consider it.27 However, even in these states,
prosecutors can usually introduce lack of remorse evidence in rebuttal. 2 8 In other states, prosecutors can use such evidence to establish

the existence of other statutory aggravating circumstances (e.g., that
the crime was "heinous, atrocious, or cruel") 29 or to establish that the
23

See, e.g., Murphy, supranote 22, at 157 ("The repentant person has a better charac-

ter than the unrepentant person, and thus the repentant person-on this theory-simply
deserves less punishment than the unrepentant person.").
24 See, e.g., id. at 148-49 ("[I]t seems obvious that repentant people are less likely to
commit crimes again than are those criminals who are unrepentant.").
25

See, e.g., Dennis N. Balske, New Strategiesfor the Defense of CapitalCases, 13 AKRON L.

REV. 331, 356 (1979) ("It is. . important that the client, where appropriate, express remorse, both for the victim and the victim's family... [Additionally], the client must
honestly express contrition and seek the mercy, as opposed to forgiveness, of the jury."); see
also Phyllis Brown, Testimony of "MitigatingCircumstances". What PurposeDoes It Serve?, FED.

LAw., Sept. 1997, at 5, 5 ("Common wisdom is that a show of remorse may result in mitigation."); cf Caren Myers, Note, EncouragingAllocution at CapitalSentencing: A Proposalfor Use
Immunity, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 805-06 (1997) (endorsing allocution at capital sentenc-

ing as a way to "encourage [the defendant] to take responsibility for his actions").
26 See generallyJames R. Acker & C.S. Lanier, AggravatingCircumstancesand CapitalPunishment: Rhetoric or Real Reforms, 29 ClM. L. Buu.. 467, 496 & n.144 (1993) (listing state
statutes that proscribe consideration of nonstatutory aggravating evidence); Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1 app. at 102-19 (1980) (same).
27 See, e.g., Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837, 842 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam) ("[L]ack of
remorse is a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance and cannot be considered in a capital
sentencing."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1537 (1998); cf. State v. Price, 388 S.E.2d 84, 100
(N.C.) ("[R]emorselessness is not a statutory aggravating circumstance and may not be
argued as such."), vacatedfor reconsideration,498 U.S. 802 (1990), reinstated,418 S.E.2d 169

(N.C. 1992).
28 See, e.g., Walton v. State, 547 So. 2d 622, 625 (Fla. 1989) (per curiam) (holding that
the State can present "[lack of remorse] evidence to rebut nonstatutory mitigating evidence of remorse presented by a defendant").
29 E.g., Sired v. State, 399 So. 2d 964, 971 (Fla. 1981) ("[L]ack of remorse.., can be
offered to the jury and judge as a factor which goes into the equation ofwhether or not the
crime was specially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."); State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239, 252
(Tenn. 1989) (noting that evidence contradicting defendant's claim of remorse was relevant to establishing sufficiency of statutory aggravating circumstance that crime was "heinous, atrocious, and cruel"); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 419 S.E.2d 606, 619 (Va. 1992)
(indicating that lack of remorse is relevant in determining "'dangerousness'" and "'vileness'"); cf. State v. Langford, 813 P.2d 936, 949 (Mont. 1991) (noting that the trial "court
properly viewed [the defendant's] lack of remorse as evidence of the absence of mitigating
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defendant "constitutes a continuing threat to society." 30 In many
other states, the prosecution may freely rely on lack of remorse evidence as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance, 3 1 provided of
course that the State can demonstrate the existence of at least one
32
statutory aggravating circumstance.
South Carolina's capital statute does not list lack of remorse
among its enumerated aggravating circumstances. Nonetheless,
South Carolina law recognizes that jurors may rely not only on statufactors sufficiently substantial to call for leniency"); State v. Lord, 822 P.2d 177, 221 (Wash.
1991) (en banc) (noting that lack of remorse was relevant to determining whether the
defendant deserved leniency).
30 E.g., State v. Aragon, 690 P.2d 293, 302-03 (Idaho 1984) (noting that evidence of
defendant's "utter lack of remorse" is relevant to determining whether the defendant
"poses a continuing threat to society"); Cudjo v. State, 925 P.2d 895, 902 (Okla. Crim. App.
1996) (noting that a "defendant's ...lack of remorse" is relevant to determining the
denied, 117
statutory aggravating circumstance of being a continuing threat to society), cert.
S. Ct. 981 (1997); Chambers v. State, 903 S.W.2d 21, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (regarding
evidence of lack of remorse as relevant to showing the special circumstance that defendant
would constitute a continuing threat to society); Thomas, 419 S.E.2d at 619 (noting that
lack of remorse is relevant in determining "'dangerousness'" and " ' vileness'").
31 See, e.g., Carr v. State, 480 S.E.2d 583, 594 (Ga.) ("A defendant's lack of remorse, as
evidenced by his courtroom demeanor, is a permissible area of inquiry and argument during the sentencing phase of a capital trial."), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 313 (1997); People v.
Erickson, 513 N.E.2d 367, 380 (111. 1987) ("A defendant's [lack of] remorse is a proper
subject for consideration at sentencing." (internal quotations omitted) (brackets in original)); State v. Hamilton, 681 So. 2d 1217, 1225 (La. 1996) ("[L]ack of remorse is relevant
to the character and propensities of the defendant." (internal quotations omitted)), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1705 (1997); Bruce v. State, 616 A.2d 392, 410 (Md. 1992) ("[T]he trial
judge certainly could have found the issue of lack of remorse relevant to the sentencing.");
State v. Richardson, 923 S.W.2d 301, 322 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) ("[Defendant's] lack of
remorse for the crimes for which he was convicted was clearly relevant to his sentencing.

. .

."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 403 (1996); State v. Parker, 337 S.E.2d 497, 502 (N.C.

1985) ("If after... time for reflection remorse does not come, and there is evidence of this
fact, then lack of remorse properly may be found by the sentencing judge as an aggravating
circumstance."); State v. Lundgren, 653 N.E.2d 304, 323 (Ohio 1995) ("[The defendant's]
lack of remorse reflects upon his character."); Commonwealth v. Chester, 587 A.2d 1367,
1378 (Pa. 1991) (noting that the fact that defendants were not remorseful was a factor that
"legitimately could be weighed by the jury"); State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 353 (Utah 1993)
("A jury may legitimately consider a defendant's.., lack of remorse . ..in the penalty
phase hearing."); cf.Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414, 423 (Ky. 1985) (indicating that lack of remorse is a nonstatutory aggravating factor); Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.
2d 645, 653-54 (Miss. 1983) (en banc) (upholding admission of evidence that showed defendant "lacked remorse").
Federal law also appears to treat lack of remorse as nonstatutory aggravating evidence.
See United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525, 1541 (D. Kan. 1996) (concluding in a
federal death-penalty case that "[there does not appear to be any constitutional problem
with a 'lack of remorse' [aggravating] factor persd' (quoting Zantv. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
885 n.22 (1983) (dicta) (quoting Fair v. State, 268 S.E.2d 316, 321 (1980)))). But cf.
United States v. Davis, 912 F. Supp. 938, 946 (E.D. La. 1996) ("Without passing on whether
lack of remorse is perse an inappropriate independent [sentencing] factor to consider, the
court finds it inappropriate in this case."), affid, 132 F.3d 1454 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S.Ct. 1331 (1998).
32 See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983).
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tory aggravating factors but also on nonstatutory ones, 8 which may
include lack of remorse. 34 Assuming lack of remorse is a legitimate
aggravating circumstance under South Carolina law, the State generally cannot bring that fact to the jury's attention, at least if the defendant chooses not to take the stand. South Carolina prosecutors
comment on a nontestifying defendant's lack of remorse at their risk,
because such remarks may be held to impermissibly impinge upon the
defendant's constitutional right to remain silent.8 5

Consequently,

whatever role a defendant's lack of remorse plays in the capital sentencing decisions of South Carolina jurors, it probably plays that role
with little or no prompting from the State.
III
WHAT MAKEs JuRoRs THINK HE'S REMORSEFUL?: A
BiVARITE ANALYSIS

Common sense and conventional wisdom suggest that a remorseful defendant stands a better chance of avoiding a death sentence
than one who lacks remorse. But what makes jurors think a defendant
is remorseful?
To begin our analysis, we need some measure of how remorseful
jurors thought the defendant actually was. We asked jurors what impression they had of the defendant and whether they thought the defendant was "sorry for what [he] did. '3 6 Jurors responded to this
question by selecting a number from one to four. A one indicated
that the statement reflected the jurors' impression of the defendant

"very well," and a four indicated that the statement reflected the jurors' impression "not at all."37 Thus, the smaller the number the
more a juror thought the defendant was remorseful. We refer to this
variable as the "remorse variable," and we explore the correlation between it and the characteristics of the crime, of the defendant, and of
33 See, e.g., State v. Skipper, 328 S.E.2d 58, 62 (S.C. 1985), overruled on other grounds by
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
34
Cf State v.Jones, 340 S.E.2d 782, 784 (S.C. 1985) (noting in the context of proportionality review that defendant "admitted on the witness stand that he felt no remorse for
his crimes"), vacatedfor reconsideration,476 U.S. 1002 (1986), reinstated,378 S.E.2d 594 (S.C.
1989).
35 See State v. Diddlemeyer, 371 S.E.2d 793, 795 (S.C. 1988), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991); State v. Cockerham, 365 S.E.2d 22, 23
(S.C. 1988) (per curiam) (dicta); State v. Hawkins, 357 S.E.2d 10, 13 (S.C. 1987), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991); State v. Arther, 350 S.E.2d
187, 190-91 (S.C. 1986); cf State v.Johnson, 360 S.E.2d 317, 319 (S.C. 1987) (noting that a
prosecutor may not comment on the defendant's lack of remorse because it violates "his
constitutional right to plead not guilty and put the state to its burden of proof"). But cf
Gaskins v. McKellar, 916 F.2d 941, 951 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that prosecutorial comment on defendant's refusal to testify did not rise to the level of a due process violation).
36 Juror Interview Instrument, supra note 5, at 6 (Survey Question II.B.1).
37

Id.
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the jurors. We also examine the relation between jurors' belief in the
defendant's remorse and the race of the defendant and victim.
A.

Crime-Related Factors

Characteristics of the crime may influence jurors' beliefs about a
defendant's remorse. A murder may be so premeditated or so calculated that ex post expressions of remorse carry little credibility. In
addition, the nature of the defendant's involvement in the crime may
affect a juror's belief in his remorse. A defendant who merely stood
by while another committed the murder-a murder the defendant
did not endorse-may more credibly claim to be remorseful for his
part in the killing than the actual killer. Crime-related factors we explore include (1) the nature of the crime and (2) the defendant's
proffered reasons for acquittal.
1. Nature of the Crime
We asked jurors how well a particular word or phrase described
the murder for which the defendant had been convicted. For example, we asked jurors whether the murder was "vicious" or "bloody."3 8
The first column in Table 1 lists the twelve words or phrases we
presented to the jurors for their reaction. The jurors responded on
the same one-to-four scale that we used to measure the remorse variable-one indicating that the word or phrase described the crime "very
well" and four indicating that it described the crime "not at all." The
second and third columns in Table 1 report the mean value and the
variance of these responses. For example, nearly all jurors described
the defendant's killing as "senseless." This crime descriptor has a
mean value of 1.14 with a variance of 0.15. Jurors' responses varied
more when we asked if they would describe the killing as "vicious."
Most thought "vicious" described the killing "very well," but the responses showed greater variation than the responses to the "senseless"
crime descriptor.
Table l's next three columns explore the relation between the
crime descriptors and the remorse variable. Each column reports the
significance level, often referred to as a p-value, of a test of the hypothesis that no correlation exists between the crime descriptor and the
remorse variable.3 9 For example, in the column labeled "Life cases,"
Id. at 4 (Survey Question II.AL2).
Since the crime descriptors and the remorse variable are both ordered variables,
Kendall's T is used to test the significance reported in these three columns. See Alan
Agresti, The Effect of Category Choice on Some Ordinal Measures of Association, 71 J. Am.STAT.
Ass'N 49 passim (1976) (testing different measures practitioners use to describe the relation between two ordinal variables and concluding that Kendall's T "seems more stable
overall than the others"). For more on ordinal measures of association, see ALAN AGR='TI,
ANALYsIS OF ORDINAL GATEGORICAL DATA 156-200 (1984).
38
39
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the "vicious" row shows a significance level of .004. This number indicates that in cases in which the jury imposed a life sentence the
probability of observing by chance a correlation between "vicious" and
the remorse variable as strong or stronger than the observed correlation was approximately 4-in-1000. Therefore, at conventional levels of
statistical significance (p _ .05), we can reject the hypothesis that no
correlation exists between the perceived level of viciousness and the
perceived level of remorse. 40 In sum, the more jurors saw the crime as
being vicious, the less inclined they were to believe in a defendant's
remorse.
Similarly, the column labeled "Death cases" shows that in cases in
which the jury imposed a death sentence the probability of observing
by chance a correlation between "vicious" and the remorse variable as
strong or stronger than the observed correlation is .116. Interestingly,
the statistical significance of the relationship between viciousness and
remorse is greater in life cases than in death cases. This result may
arise because less variation in perceived viciousness and remorse exists
in death cases than in life cases. In any event, the effect moves in the
same direction for both life cases and death cases, and it is significant
or near-significant in both groups of cases.
Dividing the sample into life cases and death cases alleviates some
concern about hindsight bias. If a similar correlation exists between
the crime descriptor and the remorse variable in both life and death
cases, it is less likely that the relation is simply an artifact of whether
the juror ultimately voted to sentence the defendant to life or to
death. The fact that a similar correlation exists in both life and death
cases suggests that a relationship really does exist between the two
variables and that the observed relationship is not simply the product
of hindsight bias.

40
In other words, Table I explores the hypothesis that the crime descriptors and the
remorse variable are independent. By convention, the hypothesis being tested is called the

"null hypothesis."

GEORGE W. SNEDECOR & WILLIAM

G.

COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS 64

(8th ed. 1989). The reported significance levels are the probability of rejecting the null
hypothesis when it is true. That is, the significance levels provide an inverse measure of the
likelihood that the relation between a crime descriptor and the remorse variable shows a
real relation rather than mere random variation. The smaller the significance level, the
more surprised one would be to observe the relation if the tested hypothesis (i.e., that no
relation exists) were true. See id. By convention, results that are significant at or below the
.05 level are described as "statistically significant." See, e.g., THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS app. a at 197 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989).
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Table l's two regression-model columns also explore the relation
between the crime descriptor and the remorse variable. The goal is
again to control for sentencing outcome to the extent possible, now
using regression models rather than relying simply on significance
tests of basic correlations. The dependent variable in each model is
the remorse variable. The independent (or explanatory) variables in
each model are the crime descriptor and a dummy variable reflecting
whether or not the sentence was death. 4 1 The first regression-model
column uses juror-level data-data in which the response of each of
the sampled jurors constitutes an observation. The second regressionmodel column uses jury-level data-data in which the mean values of
each of the remorse variables for each defendant constitute an observation. Accordingly, we based the second set of models on forty-one
observations, which represent the outcome in each of the cases.
Our use of both juror-level and jury-level regression models reflects the nature of the data. The juror-level models have the advantage of exploiting all of the data because they account for individual
juror variation in beliefs about remorse within a single capital case.
But these models do not fully account for the fact that we interviewed
more than one juror in all but one case. Consequently, these models
do not reflect the high degree of within-case consistency that exists
with respect to jurors' beliefs about a defendant's remorse. The remorse variable within each case has a standard deviation of 1.0 or less
for all but nine cases, and it has a maximum value of 1.53. For a
typical case in which we interviewed four jurors, a standard deviation
of 1.0 indicates that three of the four jurors gave the same response to
the remorse question. In other words, and not surprisingly, jurors'
beliefs about a defendant's remorse depended on the case they heard.
The juror-level models do not fully account for this fact, thus potentially exaggerating the reported correlations. Thejury-level regression
models eliminate this possibility because they rely on a case-level
mean for each variable used. As a result, however, they do not make
full use of all the data. In short, the jury-level models avoid the problem of nonindependence of observations but at the price of not making full use of the data.
The two regression-model columns require additional explanation. First, each column reports the t-statistics for each crime
descriptor. In the interest of space, we report only the t-statistic, not a
41 Because the remorse variable is ordinal and takes on more than two values (recall
thatjurors responded on a one-to-four scale), we used ordered logit-regression models for
the juror-level regression. See generally ALAN AGRESrI, CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYsIs 261-63,
265-66 (1990) (exploring logit models that exploit ordinality). We employ ordered logit
models that account for the fact that the data are clustered by defendants. We used ordinary least-squares regression models for the jury-level regression because the dependant
variable is continuous. See id. at 2.
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regression coefficient or a significance level. 42 Suffice it to note that a

t-statistic of 1.96 corresponds to a significance level of .05. Any entries
in the regression-model columns greater than 1.96, or less than -1.96,
are significant at or beyond the .05 level. For example, note that the
"vicious" row shows t-statistics of -2.591 and -2.029 for the two regression models. Consequently, in both the juror- and jury-level regression models one can reject the hypothesis that no correlation exists
between the perceived level of viciousness and the perceived level of
remorse. 43 Second, since we coded the crime descriptors and the remorse variable on the same ordinal scale, a positive t-statistic reflects a
positive correlation between remorse and the crime descriptor, while
a negative sign reflects a negative correlation. For example, the negative sign on the "vicious" t-statistics means that the more inclined jurors are to describe the crime as vicious, the less inclined they are to
believe a defendant is remorseful.
Two of the crime descriptors-"calculated" and "cold blooded"are statistically significant for life cases, death cases, and all cases combined, and they are also significant in both regression models. "Depraved" follows the same pattern but is not as significant in the jurylevel regression model. Three other descriptors-"gory," "vicious,"
and "senseless"-are statistically significant or near-significant in life
cases and all cases combined, but not in death cases. Of these three,
"vicious" is significant or near-significant in both regression models.
Surprisingly, one descriptor-"bloody"-actually correlated in the
"wrong" direction: jurors who thought the crime was bloody also
thought the defendant was remorseful. However, this result is significant only in death cases, and it is only marginally significant in the
jury-level regression. With respect to the remaining crime descriptors,
the relation between the descriptor and the jurors' belief in the defendant's remorse begins to fade. Indeed, no relation may exist between
these variables and the remorse variable.
Table 1 suggests that jurors who believe the defendant's crime
required some degree of preparation or planning-"calculated,"
"cold blooded," and (perhaps) "vicious"-usually don't think that the
defendant is remorseful. Jurors faced with such crimes may be reluctant to credit any ex post expression of remorse. This result suggests
that jurors would not have believed McVeigh even if he had said he
was sorry. The negative correlation between "vicious" and remorse
also may indicate that jurors simply don't care about remorse if they
consider the crime bad enough. On the other hand, defendants who
42
The t-statistic
results from dividing the regression coefficient by the coefficient's
standard error. One can compute the significance level from the t-statistic. See LAWRENCE
C. HAMILTON, REGRESSION WITH G ArHics 42-45 (1992).
43 See supra note 40 for discussion of the null hypothesis.
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commit crimes that look bad-crimes that jurors describe as "bloody"
or the "work of a 'mad man"'-but that don't look planned still have a
chance to convince jurors of their remorse.
2.

Reasons Offered for Acquittal

Table 2 explores the relation between the reasons the defendant
offered during trial for why the jury should acquit him and jurors'
belief in his remorse. Here we coded explanations as zero-one
"dummy variables," with zero indicating that the defense did not present the specified reason and one indicating that it did. Thus, the
"Mean" column shows the percentage ofjurors who reported that the
defendant presented the specified reason. As in Table 1, we present
three columns of significance tests, which report the significance of
the relation between the reason presented and the jurors' belief in
the defendant's remorse. 44 The two regression columns in Table 2,
like those in Table 1, report t-statistics from juror-level and jury-level
regression models. To be consistent with Table 1, we have adjusted
the sign on the t-statistics so that a positive sign again correlates with
greater remorse and a negative sign correlates with less remorse. 4 5 To
illustrate, consider the defendant who claims he "had no role whatsoever in the killing." Table 2's first row shows that this acquittal reason
correlates with reduced belief in the defendant's remorse in both regression models. Thus, a defendant who proffers this excuse during
trial should not expect jurors to believe he is remorseful during the
penalty phase.
Table 2 also suggests that jurors are more likely to think a defendant is remorseful if the reason he offers for acquittal either emphasizes his minor role in the crime-but does not claim he had no role
at all-or otherwise reduces his culpability. For example, a correlation exists between a defendant's explanation that he "had only a minor role in the killing" and a juror's belief that the defendant was
remorseful. Moreover, the significance tests and the t-statistics from
the regression models indicate that this correlation is statistically significant in death cases, in all cases combined, and in the juror-level
regression model (t-statistic = 2.422; p = .020). In short, jurors are
more likely to believe in a defendant's remorse if they think he had
only a minor role in the crime.
44 The significance tests in Table 2 are based on the Mann-Whitney test. See H.B.
Mann & D.R Whitney, On a Test of Whether One of Two Random Variables Is Stochastically
Larger than the Other, 18 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STAT. 50 (1947).
45 Since the acquittal reasons are coded zero-one and the remorse variable is coded
on a decreasing one-to-four scale (i.e., the greater the number, the less jurors' belief in a
defendant's remorse), a positive sign on a t-statistic without adjustment would mean that
the presence of an acquittal reason corresponds with reduced belief in the defendant's
remorse.
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Other reasons reflecting the defendant's diminished culpability
bore a similar relation to jurors' beliefs about the defendant's remorsefulness. Self-defense, provocation, lack of intent, accident or
mistake, and mental illness all correlate with an increased belief
among jurors in the defendant's remorse. The strongest effect occurs
when the defendant claims that his killing was unintentional or impulsive. The correlation between this defense and jurors' belief in the
defendant's remorse achieved significance in both life cases and all
cases combined, and it approached significance in death cases. The
relationship is also significant in the regression models (juror-level, p
< .001;jury-level, p < .001).46 Put another way, a defendant's claim of
diminished culpability made his remorse more believable.
In contrast to defendants who emphasized diminished culpability, defendants who insisted that they had no role in the crime did not
fare well. Table 2's first row shows that defendants advanced this argument in 34% of the cases we studied. In the context of the particular case, this defense may have been the wisest strategy. But it is also a
risky strategy, at least insofar as defendants who disclaim any role in
the offense have a harder time convincing jurors of their remorse.
Table 2 shows that denying responsibility correlates with reduced belief in the defendant's remorse. This correlation is significant in life
cases, in all cases combined, and in the juror-level regression model (p
= .013). Similarly, jurors were less likely to find remorse if defendants
claimed that the State failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. Like the "no-involvement defense," this "not-proven" defense
correlates with reduced belief in the defendant's remorse, although
the effect is not statistically significant.
B.

Defendant-Related Factors

We next explore the relation between jurors' belief in the defendant's remorsefulness and (1) their views of the defendant's demeanor and behavior at trial and (2) their beliefs about the
defendant's life and character.

46 These results mesh with the results of another question that asked jurors about
their thoughts on the nature of the defendant's guilt. Jurors who thought that the defendant definitely had killed the victim, but might not have planned or intended to do so,

were more likely to think he was remorseful. Fifty percent of the jurors reported thinking
this way, which bears a highly statistically significant relation to their thoughts about the
defendant's remorse. SeeJuror Interview Instrument, supranote 5, at 26 (Survey Question
IV.2 (recoded to zero-one)). The significance level of the correlation is .004 in life cases
and beyond .001 in death cases. The effect is also significant beyond .001 in regression
models similar to those reported in Table 2.
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1. Behavior and Demeanor at Trial
One naturally expects a defendant's demeanor and behavior at
trial to influence jurors' impressions of his remorsefulness. Table 3
examines this expectation. For the demeanor variables, like the variables in Table 2, we used zero-one dummy variables. Table 3's "Mean"
column reports the percentage ofjurors stating that a factor was present. The next three columns, as in Tables I and 2, list the significance
levels of the relation between the remorse variable and the particular
demeanor variable. Finally, one can interpret the t-statistics in the
same manner as before: a positive sign correlates with increasing remorse and a negative sign correlates with decreasing remorse.
Several questions asked jurors what impressions they formed
about the defendant during trial. One question asked jurors pointblank whether they thought the defendant was sorry for what he had
done. Another asked whether the defendant appeared sincere. Jurors' answers to both of these questions strongly correlate with their
belief in the defendant's remorse. But this is not surprising. We expect remorse to correlate with itself and with variables similar to it.
Questions that relate to other aspects of the defendant's demeanor and behavior (and that do not overlap quite so obviously with
the remorse variable) also correlate with jurors' beliefs about the defendant's remorsefulness. For example, jurors tended to believe in a
defendant's remorse if he appeared "uncomfortable or ill at ease."
This demeanor variable significantly correlates with the remorse variable in both death cases and all cases combined, and it approaches
significance in life cases. Both regression models also illustrate the
significance or near significance of this relation (juror-level, p = .006;
jury-level, p = .108). We further found that jurors were more likely to
believe in a defendant's remorse if they detected a change in his
"mood or attitude" after the guilty verdict, and 30% of jurors did in
fact detect such a change. This demeanor variable correlates with the
remorse variable to near-significance in life cases and to high-significance in death cases, in all cases combined, and in the juror-level regression model (p = .008).
One thing a defendant should not do if he hopes to convince
jurors of his remorse is look bored. Table 3 dramatically demonstrates thatjurors who thought the defendant was bored were unlikely
to think he was remorseful. This relation is highly significant in all
classes of cases and in both regression models.
Finally, among the hardest questions facing a capital defendant is
deciding whether to take the stand or make a statement during the
penalty phase. Table 3's last row shows that nearly two-thirds of the
defendants in the sample decided to take the stand or make a statement. The wisdom of that decision naturally depends on the facts and
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circumstances of each particular case. But in general jurors are more
likely to think a defendant is remorseful if he speaks on his behalf
than if he says nothing. The relation between this variable and the
remorse variable is significant in death cases and in all cases combined, and it approaches significance in the juror-level regression
model (p = .061).
2.

Life and Character

It stands to reason that jurors' belief in a defendant's remorse
depends not only on how he acts at trial but also on what jurors think
of him more generally. Table 4 examines the relation between various beliefs jurors may hold about a defendant and their belief in his
remorse. As we did with the crime-descriptor variables in Table 1, we
coded the defendant-characteristic variables in Table 4 on an ordinal
one-to-four scale. A positive sign on the regression model t-statistic
therefore correlates with jurors being more likely to believe in a defendant's remorse, and a negative sign correlates with jurors' being
more skeptical of a defendant's remorse.
Some of the jurors' beliefs about the defendant closely relate to
his crime. For example, we asked jurors if they would describe the
defendant as "vicious, like a mad animal," "lack[ing] basic human instincts," or "crazy when he committed [the] crime." Not surprisingly,
jurors who thought the defendant was vicious or lacked basic human
instincts were disinclined to think he was remorseful. In contrast, jurors who thought the defendant went crazy tended to believe in his
remorse, perhaps because they thought being crazy at the time of the
crime diminished his culpability for the crime.
But jurors apparently distinguish between being momentarily
crazed at the time of the crime and having a general background of
mental disturbance, and the distinction influences what they think
about a defendant's remorsefulness. For example, jurors' belief that
the defendant is "mentally defective or retarded" or "emotionally unstable or disturbed" bore little relation to their sense that he was remorseful. In contrast, jurors' belief that the defendant is "dangerous
to other people" or has "a history of violence and crime" correlated
significantly with reduced belief in his remorse. In short, if jurors
think the defendant is dangerous, they are highly unlikely to think he
is truly sorry.
Conversely, if jurors think the defendant will not be dangerous,
they are more inclined to think he is remorseful. For example, a
strong correlation exists by all measures between jurors' belief that
the defendant was basically "a good person who got off on the wrong
foot" and their belief in his remorse. Jurors might think that such a
defendant can learn from his mistakes and change his ways. Likewise,
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a strong correlation exists between jurors' belief in the defendant's
remorse and their belief in his love for his family. Jurors perhaps
think that defendants who are capable of showing love to their families also have the capacity to experience remorse.
Jurors' reactions to the defendant's drug and alcohol use present
a puzzle. On the one hand, Table 4 shows only an insignificant correlation between the jurors' belief that the defendant is either a drug
addict or an occasional drug user and their belief in his remorsefulness. On the other hand, Table 4 shows a significant correlation, in
life cases and in both regression models, between the jurors' belief
that the defendant is either an alcoholic or an occasional alcohol user
and their belief in his remorse. One possible explanation for this difference might be that jurors can empathize with the use and untoward effects of alcohol, but not of drugs.
C. Juror-Related Factors
We next examine the relationship between remorse and (1) jurors' general attitudes toward the death penalty and (2) jurors' personal characteristics, such as sex, race, and education.
1. Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty
Table 5 examines the relation between jurors' beliefs about the
morality, efficacy, and administration of the death penalty and their
beliefs about a defendant's remorsefulness. For this Table, we coded
juror attitudes on a one-to-six scale, with one indicating that the juror
strongly agreed with the described attitude and six indicating that the
juror strongly disagreed. A positive sign on the regression-model tstatistic indicates that agreement with the attitude correlates positively
with belief in the defendant's remorse, and a negative sign indicates
that it correlates negatively.
In general, if jurors expressed strong views in favor of the death
penalty on either deterrence or retributive grounds, they tended not
to think the defendant was remorseful. For example, jurors who
thought more executions would mean fewer murders (deterrence jurors) generally did not believe in a defendant's remorse. Similarly, in
life cases and in both regression models, jurors who thought "murderers owe something more than life in prison to society" (arguably retributivist jurors) were significantly less likely to believe the
defendant's claim of remorse. 47 In contrast, if jurors expressed
"moral doubts" about the death penalty, they tended to be more likely
47 Similarly, jurors who thought the death penalty should be "required' for anyone
.convicted of a serious intentional murder" were also less likely to believe the defendant
was remorseful.
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to believe in the defendant's remorse, although this result is significant only in death cases and in all cases combined.
2.

Personal Characteristics

Jurors' sense of the defendant's remorse may depend not only on
what they think about the death penalty, but also on who they are.
Table 6 explores this possibility, looking at the relation between jurors' belief in the defendant's remorse and the jurors' sex, race, activities, economic status, religion, employment, and education. We
coded most of these juror characteristics as zero-one dummy variables.
Table 6's "Mean" column therefore shows the proportion of jurors
who described themselves as having the stated characteristic. We
coded the last two variables in Table 6, age and income, differently.
We coded age on a continuous scale and income on an ordinal scale.
A positive sign on the regression-model t-statistic again indicates that
the presence of the factor correlates with an increasing belief in the
defendant's remorse, and a negative sign indicates that the factor's
presence correlates with a decreasing belief in the defendant's
48
remorse.
Nearly half the jurors we surveyed were white females. Compared
to white males and black females, white females were the least likely to
think the defendant was remorseful. This result is significant in both
life cases and death cases, and significant or marginally significant in
both regression models. 49 Nevertheless, whatever role white-female
status has in explaining juror perceptions of defendant remorse, it has
50
no significant influence on the sentencing decision.
In contrast to white females, black males (who comprised seven
percent of the jurors we surveyed) showed the opposite tendency.
The relation between being a black male and believing in the defendant's remorse approaches significance in life cases and in the jurylevel regression model. Moreover, it is highly significant in death
Because we coded the juror characteristics zero-one (and on an increasing ordinal
48
scale in the case of age and income) and the remorse variable on a decreasing one-to-four
scale, a positive sign on a t-statistic without adjustment would mean that the presence of a
juror characteristic corresponds with reduced belief in the defendant's remorse.
49
This "white female" effect may also explain the relation between the remorse variable and the "housewife-homemaker" employment characteristic insofar as most of those
jurors in our sample who described themselves as "housewife-homemaker" were also white
females.
50
This statement is based on regression models similar to those reported in Table 10,
infra, that include a variable for white-female status. But cf. Michael G. Rumsey, Effects of
Defendant Background and Remorse on SentencingJudgmwnts, 6J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 64, 66
(1976) (presenting results of experimental study in which "[s]exes did not differ in their
ratings of defendant remorse," but in which, to a marginally significant degree, "[f]emales
tended to give higher sentences than males" when the defendant was "in the non-remorseful condition").

[Vol. 83:1599
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cases, in all cases combined, and in the juror-level regression model.
Other personal characteristics showed no robust significant correlation with remorse. 51
Does the fact that white females appear less likely to believe in a
defendant's remorse depend on the defendant's race? For example,
could it be that white females are just as inclined as other groups to
believe in the remorse of white defendants, but especially disinclined to
believe in the remorse of black defendants? It seems not. When we
test this hypothesis we find that the reluctance of white females to
believe a defendant is remorseful does not depend on the defendant's
race. The effect is approximately the same for white defendants and
black defendants alike. Indeed, this result is the same for all race and
gender combinations of jurors. Another question is whether females
and males are both more likely to find remorse in defendants of their
own gender. Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis because
our data included only two female defendants.
D.

Race-Related Factors

Race has a profound influence on the administration of the
death penalty. Empirical studies of capital sentencing have detected
the influence of racial discrimination in prosecutorial charging decisions5 2 and injury decision making. 53 Here, we try to assess the influence, if any, of race on jurors' belief in a defendant's remorse. Table
7 presents our results. In the regression models, a positive sign for the
t-statistic indicates that the existence of a particular racial factor corre54
lates with an increased belief in the defendant's remorse.
The data show some interesting, but not easily explained, effects.
At the juror level in life cases, black-defendant status correlates more
with weaker findings of remorse than white-defendant status. But this
effect switches direction in death cases. In these cases, black-defendant status correlates with stronger findings of remorse than whiteJuror income and education levels below 12th grade exhibit some statistical interest, but their relation with remorse fades in more complete regression models such as
those explored in Part MV.
51

52

See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDus ET AL.,

EQUALJusncE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 403

(1990)

(describing prosecutorial discrimination in Georgia);John H. Blume et al., Post-McCleskey
Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1781-82 (1998)
(describing prosecutorial discrimination in South Carolina).
53
See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., RacialDiscriminationand the DeathPenalty in the PostFurman Era:An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findingsfrom Philadelphia,83 CoRNELL L. REV. 1638, 1684-85 (1998) (finding that the victim's or defendant's race influences
the jurors' weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors).
54
Since we coded the racial characteristics zero-one and the remorse variable on a
decreasing one-to-four scale, a positive sign on a t-statistic without adjustment would mean
that the presence of a racial characteristic corresponds with reduced belief in the defendant's remorse.
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defendant status. These effects tend to cancel one another out, leaving no significant results for the combined group of life and death
cases. A similar pattern exists in cases with black defendants and
white victims. The jury-level regression model shows a significant
race-of-victim effect (p = .061). A black victim correlates with decreased belief in the defendant's remorse. In models not reported
here, however, this effect becomes insignificant when we control for
other factors about the crime related to remorse, such as the coldbloodedness of the crime. Moreover, because our study included only
three black-victim cases, one should regard any race-of-victim findings
with caution.
TABLE

7

RELATION BETWEEN RACIAL FACrORS AND REMORSE
(Survey Question IL.A.4.c)
Significance tests of
relation between
racial factor and
remorse
All
Death
Life
cases
cases
cases

Regression models
that control for
sentencing outcome
t-statistics

n
Juror level Jury level
Mean
Racial factor
Race of defendant
150
0.820
.733
-0.566
0.39
.034
.158
(0 = white, 1 = black)
Race of victim
-2.033
150
0.07
.376
.215
.399
-1.925
(0 = white, 1 = black)
150
.892
0.071
0.734
0.32
.101
.034
Black defendant-white victim
Noa: The dependent variable in the regression models is the remorse variable. The independent variables are the racial factors in each row plus a dummy variable for whether a death
sentence was imposed. Jury-level results are based on 41 cases. A positive sign on the t-statistics indicates that the presence of the factor correlates positively with the presence of remorse.

IV
WHAT MAKES JURORS THiNK HE'S REMORSEFUL?:
MULTVARmATE ANALYSIS

A

Because many factors can influence jurors' beliefs about a defendant's remorsefulness, sorting out their relative influence requires
multivariate analysis. Unfortunately, with forty-one cases and 153 interviews it is impossible to construct meaningful models using most, or
even a fraction, of the available variables. For example, Table 1 reports jurors' responses to twelve different crime descriptors, thus
yielding twelve possible variables that we could use in a model. Some
of those variables (e.g., "bloody," "gory," and "vicious") are far from
mutually exclusive.
A. Factor Analysis
We use factor analysis to reduce the number of variables in our
models to a subset of variables that measure different aspects ofjuror
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responses. "Factor analysis is a mathematical technique for reducing a
complex system of correlations into fewer dimensions."5 5 It identifies
a subset of common factors from a larger set of original variables.
For example, the crime-descriptor variables reported in Table 1
do not actually measure twelve distinct aspects of the crime. Factor
analysis allows us systematically to reduce the number of crime
descriptors in two ways. First, it allows us to identify which of the individual crime descriptors best represent the twelve descriptors as a
whole. Second, it allows us to construct new, artificial factors that better capture the information contained in the crime-descriptor variables. We can then use these new factors themselves to model
remorse. Because factor analysis requires continuous variables, we
can only apply it to the jury-level models.
As applied to the crime characteristics in Table 1, factor analysis
reduces the twelve different variables to two dimensions, which to55
STEPHENJAY GouLD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 275 (rev. ed. 1996). Factor analysis is
based on a model in which the observed vector is partitioned into an unobserved "systematic" component and an unobserved "error" part. See RICHARD A. JOHNSON & DEAN W.
WICHERN, APPLIED MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 397 (3d ed. 1992) (describing the

mathematical underpinnings of factor analysis). The model considers the components of
the error vector to be uncorrelated or independent, while it considers the systematic part
as a linear combination of a relatively small number of unobserved factor variables. See id.
at 397-99. The analysis separates the effects of the factors from the errors. In contrast to
principal component analysis, which describes or "explains" the variability observed, see id.
at 403-09, factor analysis gives a description or explanation of the interdependence of a set
of variables in terms of the factors without regard to the observed variability. See id. Statisticians originally developed factor analysis for the analysis of scores on mental tests, but the
methods are useful in a much wider range of situations. See id. at 396-97. For example,
one can use factor analysis to analyze sets of attitudes, sets of physical measurements, and
sets of economic quantities.
To illustrate, consider a researcher who gives a battery of tests to a group of individuals. Here, the score of an individual on a given test is more related to his scores on other
tests than to the scores of other individuals on the other tests. That is, the scores for any
particular individual are usually interrelated to some degree. This interrelation is "explained" by considering an individual's test score made up of (1) a part which is peculiar to
this particular test (called error) and (2) a part which is a function of more fundamental
quantities (called "scores of primary abilities" or "factor scores"). Because each individual
enters several test scores, their effect connects the various scores. Roughly, the idea is that
a person who is "more intelligent" in some respects will do better on many tests than someone who is "less intelligent."
The interpretation of the factor loadings is most straightforward if each variable is
loaded highly on at most one factor, and if all the factor loadings are either large and
positive or near zero, with few intermediate values. The researcher then splits the variables
into disjoint sets, each of which is associated with one factor, although perhaps some will
be left over. He can then interpret a particular factor as an average quality over those
variables for which the loading is large. The factors in a factor analysis model are mathematical abstractions and do not necessarily have any intuitive meaning. In particular, we
may rotate the factors without affecting the validity of the model, and we can freely choose
a rotation which makes the factors as intuitively meaningful as possible. Choosing a rotation subjectively is considered a disadvantage because the factor analyst may try to force the
factor loadings to fit his own preconceived pattern. A convenient analytical choice of rotation is given by the varimax method, which we used here.

1998]

THE ROLE OF REMORSE

1629

gether explain over eighty percent of the variation in the pattern of
responses to the twelve questions. The two variables that best represent these two dimensions are "cold blooded" and "work of a 'mad
man."' We therefore include both of these factors in the multivariate
models.
The variables in Table 2 relating to the defendant's explanation
for the crime also reduce to two dimensions. The "defendant was in-,
sane" and "it was an unintentional or impulsive act" best represent
these dimensions. Because the insanity variable substantially overlaps
with the "work of a 'mad man"' variable, we exclude insanity from the
models. We therefore include only the fact that the crime was unintentional or impulsive.
The variables reported in Table 3 relating to the defendant's demeanor or behavior reduce to one dimension. This dimension does
not substantially differ from remorse itself. We therefore include
none of the variables from Table 3 in the multivariate models.
The defendant-characteristic variables in Table 4 reduce to three
dimensions. One is well represented by "emotionally unstable or disturbed," which we interpret as substantially overlapping with the
"work of a 'mad man"' variable from Table 1. A second is represented
by remorse itself, which we cannot sensibly use to explain remorse.
The third is well represented by the description of the defendant as an
"alcoholic," which neither overlaps with any other variable we propose
to include in the model nor reduces to remorse itself. Accordingly,
we include only "alcoholic" in the multivariate models.
Table 5's juror-attitude variables reduce to one dimension, best
represented by the statement that "[m]urderers owe something more
than life in prison to society and especially to their victim's families."
We therefore include this variable in the multivariate models.
Table 6's juror-background characteristics are not so clearly amenable to factor analysis. Most of them represent distinct aspects of the
jurors' backgrounds. We include a dummy variable for white females
because that characteristic is the onlyjuror characteristic (other than
"housewife-homemaker") that is statistically significant or nearly so in
both the juror-level and the jury-level regression models. We tested
various education and employment dummy variables, but found that
none has much explanatory power at either the jury level or the juror
level.
B.

Multivariate Analysis

As in the prior tables, we employ two kinds of multivariate models: ordered logit models at the juror level and ordinary least-squares
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models at the jury level. 56 We also include a logistic regression model

that uses a binary remorse variable. In order to construct this binary
variable, we treat responses of one and two to the remorse-variable
question as an indication that the juror believes the defendant is remorseful. We treat responses of three and four as an indication that
the juror believes the defendant lacks remorse. This binary variable
allows us to account for the clustering by defendant of the data at the
jury level. For each model of remorse, we include as an explanatory
variable whether the defendant received a death sentence. Including
this variable helps control for the possibility that jurors' beliefs about
a defendant's remorse correlate with whether or not they imposed a
death sentence. Table 8 presents the results. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. We also report robust t-statistics for the ordinary least
squares models. 57 We have adjusted the signs on the t-statistics so that
the increased presence of a factor corresponds with greater remorse
58
for all variables in all models.
We find that the perceived cold-bloodedness and intentionality of
the crime generally correlate strongly and significantly or near-significantly with the remorse variable. The nature of the crime and the
defendant's mental state thus powerfully influence jurors' beliefs
about the defendant's remorse, even in multivariate models.5 9
In addition, we find some evidence that a correlation exists between white-female status and disbelief in the defendant's remorse.
This effect is significant in all juror-level models and moves in the
same direction in the jury-level models. The alcoholic effect is not
robust when we account for the clustered nature of the data, and the
personal attitudinal variable ("murderers owe more to society than life
in prison") loses significance in the jury-level model.

56

See supranote 41.

57 See Peter J. Huber, The Behavior of Maximum Likelihood Estimates Under Nonstandard
Conditions, in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH BERKELEY SYMPOSIUM ON MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND PROBABiLrrY

221 (1967).

58 Because a value of one on the binary version of the remorse variable corresponds
to the presence of remorse, the signs for the coefficients for models using this variable
without adjustment would be the opposite of the signs for the coefficients in the other two
kinds of models.
59
Factor analysis also allows us to construct new synthetic variables consisting of linear combinations of the real-world variables in the tables. In jury-level regression models
using synthetic variables, we found that three of these variables were highly statistically
significant: two synthetic variables constructed from Table l's list of crime descriptors and
one synthetic variable constructed from Table 2's list of acquittal-reasons. These synthetic
variables roughly correspond with the real-world variables "cold-blooded," "work of a 'mad
man,'" and "unintentional." Overall, models using the synthetic variables add little to the
models using the corresponding real-world variables.
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TABLE

8

REGRESSION MODELS OF REMORSE
Dependent variable = remorse (coded 1 to 4, with 1 indicating its
strongest presence)

Independent variable

Ordered logit
models of remorse
(juror-level)
2
1

Logistic models of
binary remorse
variable
(juror-level)
4
3

OLS regression
models of remorse
(jury-level)
5
6

Crime was cold blooded

-1.287
(-2.658)

-1.242
(-3.049)

-1.387
(-2.474)

-1.430
(-3.016)

-0.383
(-1.387)

-0.490
(-2.310)

Crime was unintentional

0.796
(1.939)

1.127
(3.192)

0.420
(0.814)

0.949
(2.185)

0.737
(2.299)

0.893
(3.753)

Crime was work of a
"mad man"

-

-

0.224
(1.501)
-1.405
(-4.041)

-0.977
(-2.031)

0.253
(1.221)
-1.330
(-2.746)

-0.341
(-0.991)

0.213
(2.132)
-0.507
(-1.325)

Juror was white female

-1.378
(-3.297)

Criminal offenders owe
more to society than
life in prison

-0.549
(-3.245)

-

-0.548
(-2.852)

-

-0.101
(-0.818)

-

0.391
(1.774)

-

0.161
(0.614)

-

0.154
(1.386)

-

Defendant was an
alcoholic
Death sentence
Constant

-1.918
(-3.931)

-1.461
(-3.533)

-0.528
(-2.972)

-0.422
(-2.348)

-

-2.193
(-2.364)

-1.243
(-1.701)

3.081
(6.810)

2.972
(7.045)

-

-

0.330

0.270

0.579

0.580

114

137

114

137

40

41

-

83.3

80.3

-

-1.595
(-3.745)
-

2
Pseudo r 2 or adjusted r

Number of observations
Percentage correctly
classified

-

-1.022
(-2.906)

-

NoTE: The dependent variable in the regression models is the remorse variable. A positive sign
on the coefficients and t-statistics indicates that the presence of the factor correlates positively
with the presence of remorse.

V
DOES REMORSE MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO THE SENTENCE?

Do jurors' beliefs about the defendant's remorse correlate with
the sentence they impose? We examine this question using both bivariate and multivariate analysis. The short answer is yes. The more
subtle answer is that remorse matters, but not as much as the perceived viciousness of the crime. Ifjurors think the crime is extremely
vicious, their belief that the defendant is remorseful is unlikely to convince them to impose a life sentence. On the other hand, ifjurors do
not think the crime is extremely vicious, then remorse can make a
60
difference.
60 In an earlier study designed to examine the sentencing decision of capital jurors,
William Geimer andJonathan Amsterdam surveyed jurors who sat on five capital cases in
Florida in which the jury returned a death sentence. See William S. Geimer & Jonathan
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Bivariate Analysis

Table 9 summarizesjuror responses to three questions that asked
them about their belief in the defendant's remorsefulness. Question
1 forms the basis for our standard remorse variable. The responses
ranged from one to four, with a response of one indicating that the
juror strongly believed that the defendant was sorry for what he had
done and a response of four indicating that the juror did not think
that the defendant was sorry at all. Thus, the smaller the number the
stronger the jurors' belief in the defendant's remorse.
TABLE

9

RELATION BETWEEN DEFENDANT'S REMORSE AND
DEATH SENTENCE

(Survey Questions II.B.1, IV.3, II.B.4)
Significance of
difference between

Question
1. What was your impression of the
defendant? Sorry for what he
did? (1=very well... 4=not at
all)
2. When you were considering
punishment, did you believe
defendant was truly sorry for

Mean

Variance

life and death jurors

n

2.93

1.13

.0001

150

3.80

1.78

.0000

148

0.30

0.21

.0002

151

the crime? (1=yes ... 5=no)

3. How did defendant appear to
you at trial? Sorry for what he
had done? (1=yes, 0=no)

Question l's mean of 2.93 (on a one-to-four scale) indicates that
on average jurors did not believe defendants were remorseful. The
difference, however, between jurors' beliefs about the defendant's remorse in life cases and in death cases is highly significant (p =
Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: OperativeFactors in Ten FloridaDeath Penalty Cases,
15 AM. J. CRiM. L. 1,2-9 (1988). They report that nine of 28 jurors (32%) indicated in
response to an open-ended inquiry that the defendant's "[d]emeanor," which included
among other things "lack of remorse," constituted an "[o]perative [fmactor[ ]"in the decision to return a death sentence. Id. at 40 & tbl.3. From among the factors Geimer and
Amsterdam reported, "demeanor" was third most important, behind the jurors' belief that
a presumption in favor of death existed at the penalty phase (54%) and the "manner of
the killing" (64%). Id.
Other studies using controlled experiments involving noncapital offenses have also
.reported more leniency for remorseful offenders." Chris L. Kleinke et al., Evaluation of a
Rapist as a Function of Expressed Intent and Remorse, 132J. Soc. PSYCHOL 525, 534 (1992); see
also W. Andrew Harrel, The Effects of Alcohol Use and Offender Remorsefulness on Sentencing
Decisions, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 83, 86 (1981) ("More severe sentences were given to
non-remorseful than to remorseful individuals."); Rumsey, supra note 50, at 67 tbl.1 (providing data indicating that highly remorseful defendants received shorter sentences).
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.0001).61 Assuming that the jurors' responses accurately reflect the
beliefs they held during the trial, we can therefore firmly reject the
null hypothesis that no difference exists between life-case jurors and
death-case jurors with respect to their beliefs about the defendant's
remorse. 62 In short, ifjurors believed that the defendant was sorry for
what he had done, they tended to sentence him to life imprisonment,
not death.
Like Question 1, Question 2 asked jurors whether they believed
that the defendant was sorry for what he had done. But Question 2
focused more specifically on the jurors' thoughts as they were considering punishment. Once again, jurors do not believe on average that
defendants are remorseful (mean = 3.80). However, the difference
between the responses of life-case jurors and death-case jurors is statistically significant (p < .001). Consequently, ifjurors do think the defendant is remorseful, they are more apt to sentence him to life
imprisonment than to death. Question 3, which asked whether the
defendant appeared "[s] orry for what he had done" during the trial,
confirms the pattern of responses shown in Questions 1 and 2.
Moreover, these results are consistent with another Project study
of South Carolina capital jurors. 63 According to that study, 39.8% of
the jurors responded that the defendant's lack of remorse made or
would have made them more likely to vote for death. 6 4 For the remainder, the defendant's remorse made or would have made little
difference one way or another. 65 To put this result in perspective,
among those aggravating factors relating to the defendant, the two
most powerful in jurors' minds were the defendant's prior history of
violent crime and the jurors' belief in his future dangerousness. Their
belief in his lack of remorse was third.

B.

Multivariate Analysis

The bivariate analysis suggests a relatively strong correlation between jurors' belief in the defendant's remorsefulness and their sentencing decision. We now examine whether this correlation survives
when we control for other factors that may influence the sentencing
decision.
Prior research suggests that the three most important factors that
influence the capital-sentencing decision are the jurors' beliefs about
61 We used a Mann-Whitney test to measure statistical significance in Table 8. See
supranote 44.
62
See supra note 40 for a discussion of the null hypothesis.
63
See Garvey, supra note 4.
64
See id. at 1560.
65 The responses of jurors who sat on juries returning verdicts of life imprisonment
and those who sat on juries returning death sentences were not significantly different. See
id. at 1571-72.
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the seriousness of the crime, about the defendant's future dangerousness, and about the defendant's remorsefulness. 66 In our multivariate
models of sentencing outcome, jurors' perceptions of the crime's viciousness served as a proxy for the crime's seriousness, though any
one of several descriptions of the crime presented in Table 1 would
serve about as well. 67 Jurors' beliefs about how long the defendant

would be imprisoned if not sentenced to death served as a proxy for
his future dangerousness. 68 Finally, the remorse variable served as a
measure of the defendant's remorsefulness.
The first and third sentencing models reported in Table 10 use
these three variables as explanatory variables. Models 1 and 2 use logistic regression to model sentencing outcome at the juror level, accounting for the fact that the sample is clustered by defendants.
Models 3 and 4 use logistic regression to model sentencing outcome
at the jury level. Models 2 and 4 add to the basic model ajuror attitudinal variable-jurors' belief that defendants who can afford good
lawyers do not receive death sentences-that correlates with sentencing outcome. We list robust t-statistics in parentheses. We adjusted
signs on both the coefficients and the t-statistics so that the increasing
presence of a factor correlates with a death sentence.
The juror-level models (Models 1 and 2) tell a consistent story.
The positive sign on the viciousness variable in each juror-level model
indicates that the more jurors thought the crime was vicious, the more
likely they were to sentence the defendant to death. Likewise, the
negative sign on the dangerousness variable in each juror-level model
indicates that the less time jurors thought the defendant would spend
in prison if sentenced to life imprisonment, the more likely they were
to sentence him to death. The negative sign on the remorse variable
indicates that the less jurors thought the defendant was remorseful,
the more likely they were to sentence him to death.
But remorse's influence varies more at the jury level than at the
juror level. In the simplest jury-level model (Model 3), the remorse
variable has the expected sign, but it does not significantly correlate
with sentencing outcome. Adding the personal attitudinal variable in
Model 4 increases the size and significance of the remorse effect, thus
mirroring its effect at the juror level.
Nonetheless, the classification results in Table 10's last two rows
show that only in Model 3 does adding remorse as an explanatory
See id. at 1654-55, 1659-61.
For example, as Table 1 demonstrates, "calculated" and "cold-blooded" also allude
to the crime's seriousness.
68
For a discussion and detailed analysis of the role of future dangerousness in capital
sentencing, see Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 2, at 4-9 ("In assessing dangerousness, the
probable actual duration of the defendant's prison sentence is an important
consideration.").
66
67
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TABLE 10
REGRESSION MODELS OF SENTENCING OUTCOME
Dependent variable = death sentence (coded 0, 1, with 1 indicating death)
Logistic regression
models of
sentencing outcome
(juror-level)

Expected time in prison if
not sentenced to death
Defendant was remorseful
Defendants who can afford
good lawyers almost never
get a death sentence
Constant
Pseudo r 2
Number of observations
Percentage correctly classified,
including remorse
Percentage correctly classified,
excluding remorse

"Low"
viciousness
cases
(jury-level)

1

2

3

4

5

1.043
(3.077)
-0.065
(-2.513)
-0.531
(-2.223)

1.521
(2.424)
-0.061
(-2.341)
-0.517
(-2.111)

3.921
(2.311)
-0.148
(-1.950)
-1.363
(-1.406)

4.786
(2.076)
-0.204
(-2.074)
-2.123
(-2.454)

11.140
(2.678)
0.120
(1.033)
-3.251
(-1.733)

1.319
(1.370)
0.193
127

-0.335
(-2.395)
0.815
(0.664)
0.270
110

Independent variable
Crime was vicious

Logistic regression
models of
sentencing outcome
(jury-level)

-

-

-

-

-1.466
(-2.653)

-

4.150
(1.417)
0.426
41

0.283
(0.082)
0.593
41

4.753
(1.229)
0.545
23

87.8

87.8

87.0

85.4

90.2

73.9

NoTE: A positive sign on the coefficients and t-statistics indicates that the presence of the factor
correlates positively with a death sentence.

variable improve the power to predict the sentencing outcome of a
particular case, and the improvement is modest. The model correctly
classifies the sentencing outcome for 87.8% of cases if we include the
remorse variable and 85.4% if we exclude it. Of course, the classification results without remorse as an explanatory variable are so powerful that little room exists for improvement. Even so, remorse
improves the classification results less than the expected-length-ofprison-term variable. For example, an unreported model that includes only viciousness as an explanatory variable yields 73.2% correct
classification. Consequently, the classification results for Models 3
and 4 indicate that adding the expected prison time substantially improves the models. Adding other variables, including remorse, does
not add much, and including remorse instead of expected prison time
does not improve classification as much as including prison time and
excluding remorse. In sum, the jury-level evidence indicates that remorse matters less than the nature of the crime and the amount of
time jurors expect a defendant will spend in prison if not sentenced to
death.
Model 5 further explores the role of remorse. It focuses on cases
in which the perceived viciousness of the crime is relatively low. The
mean on the viciousness variable is 1.0 in eighteen cases, which indi-
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cates that the jurors in those cases unanimously agreed that the crime
was as vicious as they thought it could be. We define these crimes as
"high" viciousness crimes. Conversely, we define a crime as a "low"
viciousness crime whenever the mean jury-level value for the viciousness variable exceeds 1.0, which indicates that at least one juror did
not give the crime the highest viciousness rating. Obviously, by "low"
viciousness we mean relatively low, not absolutely low.
Focusing on the twenty-three low viciousness cases shows that remorse's predictive power is strongest and most concentrated in precisely these types of cases. In Model 5, the remorse variable's
coefficient is large and significant at p = .10 in the twenty-three low
viciousness cases. In unreported models limited to the eighteen high
viciousness cases, we found the remorse variable to be insignificant.
Thus in highly vicious cases (thirteen out of eighteen of which resulted in death sentences), a defendant's remorse may not be able to
save him. But in lower viciousness cases (nine out of twenty-three of
which resulted in death sentences), remorse may make all the difference. Moreover, the last two rows of Table 10 show that the remorse
variable noticeably improves the predictive power of Model 5 for low
viciousness cases. The model that excludes the remorse variable classifies 73.9% of the sentencing outcomes correctly. Including the remorse variable increases correct classification to 87.0%.
Focusing separately on the low viciousness cases yields another
interesting result. Model 5 shows that our proxy for perceived dangerousness (expected length of a life sentence) has little explanatory
power in the low-viciousness cases. Indeed, the t-statistic even changes
sign. It moves from a negative value in all four of the full-sample models to a positive sign in Model 5. Dangerousness therefore matters
most in high viciousness cases. It is much more important than remorse in explaining the sentencing outcome in these cases. Apparently, the more vicious the case, the more jurors care about the
possibility that the State will release the defendant earlier than they
would like, and the less they care about his remorsefulness. In contrast, dangerousness is less important to jurors in low viciousness
cases, which leaves room for remorse to make a difference. Remorse
69
matters-so long as the crime is not extremely vicious.

69
Because race plays a prominent role in capital cases, we report here that we found
no significant race-of-defendant or race-of-victim effects for sentencing outcome. We do
note, however, that the racial makeup of our 41 cases confirms the finding that prosecutors seem more likely to seek the death penalty when blacks kill whites and less likely to
seek the death penalty when blacks are the victims. Table 7 indicates that 32% of our cases
had black defendants and white victims, and only seven percent of our cases had black
victims. This sample overrepresents the population of interracial homicide cases and underrepresents the population of black-victim homicide cases. See Blume et al., supra note
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We should note one final methodological issue bearing on the
problem of modeling sentencing outcomes. Sentencing models that
include remorse as an explanatory variable may suffer from an "endogeneity" problem. That is, the existence of remorse may not solely
be a function of factors exogenous to the sentencing outcome. Consequently, a "system of equations" may be the best way to model sentencing outcome. 70 In other words, it may be necessary to use two
equations, one that models sentencing outcome and one that models
remorse, and then to solve those equations simultaneously. Indeed, it
may even be that the remorse equation should contain sentencing
outcome as an explanatory variable and that the sentencing equation
should contain remorse as an explanatory variable, with those equations then being solved simultaneously. We leave these difficult modeling problems for another day.
CONCLUSION

This study represents but a beginning to the systematic analysis of
the relationship between remorse and sentencing outcome. Professor
Sundby's contribution to this Symposium already shows that ample
room exists for additional research and analysis.7 ' At the methodological level, one challenge for future research is to find ways to reduce the risk of hindsight bias. Efforts to identify the factors that
explain why jurors sentence some defendants to life imprisonment
and others to death will be of limited utility if the factors used to explain that decision are not independent of it.
With difficulties like this in mind, our results indicate that jurors'
beliefs about a defendant's remorse are strongly linked to their impressions of his crime, especially the seriousness of the crime and the
nature of the defendant's involvement in the crime. Moreover, our
results show that one group ofjurors-white females-may be less disposed to believe in the defendant's remorse than other jurors. We
also confirm the widespread conviction that remorse makes a difference to the sentence a defendant receives-provided jurors do not
think the crime is too vicious.

52, at 1781-82 (noting that in one study, prosecutors sought the death penalty in 40% of
the interracial homicide cases and in 5.2% of the black-victim cases).
70 For a general discussion of systems of equations, see WnLuM H. GREENE,
EcoNoMETRc ANALYsis 708-80 (3d ed. 1997).
71 See Scott E. Sundby, The CapitalJury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy,
Remorse, and theDeath Penalty, 83 CoRELL L. REv. 1557, 1560 (1998) (analyzing "the role of

remorse and its interaction with trial strategy, but with the recognition that a continued
need exists to study the issues").

